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The Survival of Spanish Provincial Governments in a Federal 
Polity: Reframing the Debate 
 
 
 
Short title: The Survival of Spanish Provincial Governments 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Despite harsh criticisms, Spanish provincial governments (diputaciones) have survived for 200 years and 
have remained practically unchanged since the Transition. The survival of diputaciones in a proto-
regional state is clearly a paradox that requires consideration of a range of potential explanations. 
Drawing upon extensive empirical investigation within and around three provincial governments in 2013-
2014 (Seville, Barcelona and Valencia), the survival of the diputaciones is illuminated by the path 
dependency and functional arguments, but it is most convincingly explained in terms of cartel (party) 
politics. The impact of the 2008 economic crisis has stretched these ‘party bargains’ to breaking point. 
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Introduction 
 
On 16 June 2011, former Spanish Prime minister Felipe González reopened the debate 
about diputaciones (provincial governments) by advocating ‘the suppression of 
provincial governments once for all’ (Efe, 2011). As that provocative affirmation 
demonstrated, this territorial scale continually faces harsh criticisms in Spain. 
Notwithstanding the different reforms of local governance implemented since 1985, it 
has been virtually impossible to undertake a consensual reorganization of provincial 
governments. Consequently, as in other European countries, the question of the 
suppression or reform of diputaciones frequently appears in the media.  
As the French départements, the Italian provinces, the German kreise or the Greek 
nomi, Spanish provinces are an intermediate scale between the regions and the 
municipalities. The reform of these second tiers of local governance currently lies at the 
core of structural reforms under discussion in other European countries (in particular in 
France and Italy) since the beginning of the 2008 crisis (Le Lidec, 2012, 249-267; 
Council of municipalities and Regions, 2013; Bolgherini, 2014, 194-214). However, 
when the scientific literature has focused on Spanish local power, it has generally been 
understood as the municipal level (Batley and Stoker, 1991; John, 2001; Denters and 
Rose, 2005; Page and Goldsmith, 2010; Panara and Varney, 2013; Jiménez, García 
Quesada and Villoria, 2014, 67-82). Therefore, the diputaciones remain largely 
unknown outside of Spain and have been tackled specifically by only a few Spanish 
experts (Alba and Vanaclocha, 1987; Márquez Cruz, 2007; Velasco Caballero, 2009; 
Bertrana, Espinosa and Magre, 2011, 224-242; Zafra, 2012, 152-172) – especially from 
a public law perspective (Rodríguez González, 2006; Burgueño, 2011; Jiménez 
Asensio, 2012; Moreno, 2012, 573-612; Fernández-Figueroa, 2014, 157-169). This is a 
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major gap since the reorganization of provincial governments is a big political issue for 
the Spanish public administration. 
The aim of this article is to fill this gap. The Spanish provincial governments 
currently face harsh criticisms focusing on their policy performance and the 
mechanisms of appointment of their deputies. Despite these dysfunctions, Spanish 
diputaciones have survived for 200 years and have remained practically unchanged 
since the Transition. How do we explain such stability? What drivers impede reform of 
the diputaciones? The article addresses an enduring puzzle. The survival of these pre-
democratic institutions in a proto-regional state is clearly a paradox that requires 
consideration of a range of potential explanations (of change, but especially of the 
absence of change). 
This investigation was based, first, on a broad review of the scientific and grey 
literature on devolution and local governance in Spain and Europe. Fieldwork research 
was then undertaken in three different provinces in a series of 35 in-depth interviews 
realized between October 2013 and December 2014. The provinces of Seville, Valencia 
and Barcelona were chosen for their geographic similarity (based on a big city and a 
network of metropolitan towns and small rural hamlets) and because they were 
respectively governed by the Socialist Party (PSOE), the conservative People’s Party 
(PP), and the Catalan center-right party Convergence and Union (CiU). The purposive 
sample created in the three provinces included three distinct groups: elected politicians 
(mainly PP, PSOE, Izquierda Unida and Unión, Progreso y Democracia), officials 
(working for the provinces, municipalities, autonomous communities or their 
professional associations and the state field agencies) and experts (university professors 
and journalists from Seville, Granada and Barcelona). Most of our interviewees either 
occupied or had previously occupied important positions at the state level. The 
questions were divided into different sections focusing on comparative governance, the 
problems and advantages of diputaciones, the potential solutions for improving that tier 
of government and the obstacles to reforming the territorial system. 
This article includes four parts. The first one presents the competing frameworks for 
explaining the stability of diputaciones in Spain. The second section accompanies the 
evolution of Spanish provincial governments from the long-term perspective, 
addressing the main historical institutionalist hypothesis. The third chapter examines the 
central role performed by political parties in the maintenance of the diputaciones. The 
fourth section investigates the positions of stakeholders and social groups in relation to 
the services delivered by the diputaciones. The article concludes by offering a preferred 
set of explanations based on acknowledging the strategic position occupied by Spain’s 
leading parties, while identifying new challenges to the pattern of institutional stasis.  
 
 
How to Interpret the Stability of diputaciones? Three Competing Frameworks 
 
The Institutionalist Grid 
 
Is the persistence of diputaciones best explained by institutional arguments? Two sorts 
of institutional argument appear potentially persuasive a priori. System-level, ‘old’ 
institutional arguments identify the role of heavy constitutional variables as obstacles to 
thoroughgoing territorial reform. The constitutional guarantee provided for the 
diputaciones virtually ensures their survival. Territorial reform would require a two-
thirds majority in the national parliament for modifying the status quo. The barriers are 
formidable, though not insuperable; the constitution was reformed in 2011 in 
5 
 
anticipation of the European fiscal compact and the quasi-constitutional obligation 
placed upon signatories to commit to reducing debt and deficits. While Europeanization 
can produce clear policy change, domestic politics are locked in the Spanish equivalent 
of a ‘joint-decision trap’, that is a situation in which key policy-makers can veto the 
proposals of the rest of the actors (Scharpf, 1988, 239-278). This configuration delays 
the decision-making process and encourages party-based veto-players to resist changes 
that threaten their key interests. In the final instance, the decisions adopted by the 
participants are taken at the level of the lowest common denominator (or not taken at 
all). If reform is highly improbable, however, this owes more to the determination of the 
main political parties not to lose their control over the resources of the provincial 
governments than it does to the impossibility of undertaking constitutional reform per 
se.  
At a rather different level of analysis, historical institutionalist arguments are well 
suited to explain the absence of organizational change from a variety of different 
temporal perspectives. From a longue durée perspective, the diputaciones survived 
because they have always existed; however sub-optimal in some respects, these 
intermediate organizations form part of the rules of the territorial politics game. They 
have progressively been institutionalized, and, 200 years after their creation, they have 
become embedded within different social and political environments where they sustain 
a series of interests and client groups (Mahoney 2000, 507-548). With a rather different 
timescape, premier Adolfo Suárez’s 1977 decision, taken during the Transition, to 
maintain the diputaciones in order to counterbalance the power of the autonomous 
communities, has profoundly marked the shape of Spanish territorial governance. This 
decision ‘locked in’ the structure of Spanish territorial public administration and made 
future reform much more difficult. According to Pierson (2000, 475-499), as time goes 
by, the more complex becomes a modification of the rules of the game, since the initial 
arrangement has produced a set of customs and routines. The opportunity costs of 
reform are so high because existing arrangements regulate key relationships, especially 
between the diputaciones and small rural hamlets that depend on provincial patronage 
for basic public services.  
 
The Partisan Interpretation 
 
Is the absence of territorial change best understood in terms of resource-based, 
instrumental arguments about partisan politics? The party organization hypothesis 
understands parties, in a rational choice sense, as rent seekers, determined to preserve 
their resources within the provincial governments.  From this perspective the survival of 
diputaciones is best understood in terms of party politics and (institutional and actor) 
rational choice (Miller 2000, 535-547). As Lecours (2005, 13) stressed: ‘institutions do 
not necessary crumble when they lose efficiency [and they] can survive even if they 
engender sub-optimal outcomes’. Despite the superficial criticisms against the 
diputaciones, the two leading Spanish parties have perfectly integrated the existence of 
those institutions into their organizational strategy. At the end of the day, diputaciones 
are electoral targets that need to be won through a specific strategy of conquest in order 
to obtain legitimacy, money, public jobs and parliamentary seats for the party members. 
The traditionally dominant political forces (the Socialist Party and the People’s Party) 
know that any territorial reorganization could generate losses in terms of resources for 
their own organizations and this risk aversion explains their preference for the status 
quo. More than party politics, stricto sensu, this hypothesis emphasizes cartel party 
politics; only those parties that benefit materially from office support the survival of the 
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provincial institution. Other parties are full of sound and fury in their opposition to the 
diputaciones, but their voice carries less weight (Katz and Mair, 1995, 5-28). 
 
The Functional Vision 
 
Is organizational persistence best explained by the services delivered by these 
institutions: prima facie, this would appear to be the weakest argument, as the article 
demonstrates their lack of obligatory service delivery functions? The long-term survival 
of the diputaciones, and their arrangements with municipalities and autonomous 
communities, might suggest that the diputaciones perform valid functions after all.  The 
functional hypothesis purports to explain organizational survival in terms of service 
delivery; these organizations deliver functions (political and policy) that no other level 
is capable of, or would prefer not to. This organizational niche was well articulated in 
an interview with a former member of the National Commission for the Reform of 
Local Government (interviewed in Seville, 2014): ‘As the only institution able to bring 
together small hamlets in common projects, the diputaciones ensured the legitimacy of 
the new regime under the transition. It is not a question of name: it is a question of 
function.’ The diputaciones survived because they represent general-purpose authorities 
embodying democratic legitimacy, and because they provide financial and infrastructure 
support for small local councils that would otherwise be unable to fulfil their service 
delivery responsibilities. They occupy a necessary organizational niche. 
  
Though the article is not explicitly cross-cultural, it is drawn from a major cross-
national funded comparative project in relation to the impact of economic crisis on 
territorial institutional configurations. Territorial configurations have  sometimes been 
interpreted through the prism of overarching system-wide policy styles (Page and 
Goldsmith, 2010), or state traditions (Loughlin, Hendriks and Lidstrom (2010).  The 
‘state tradition’ approach provides a heuristically insightful typology that helps to 
organize states into groupings.  Page and Goldsmith (1987) provided the classic 
distinction of northern and southern families of European sub-national experience.  
They contrasted countries with Napoleonic traditions like France, Spain and Italy, with 
their strong states and weak local government from the functionally stronger local 
governments in states like Sweden and England. In their extensive  comparative study, 
Loughlin, Hendriks and Lidstrom (2010)  identify five clusters of states: the British 
Isles, the Rhinelandic states, the Nordic states, the Southern European states and the 
new democracies. The Spanish case is particularly interesting because it cuts across two 
major traditions; the Napoleonic model, characteristic of pre-democratic Spain and 
embodied in the survival of the diputaciones; and the proto-regional state, of the type 
described by Keating (1998) in terms of a new regionalism.  Rather than place- specific 
influences, however, we insist above all on the level of analysis that this type of article 
can realistically aspire to. Much of the structural literature is phrased at the macro- or 
system-wide level, whereas our analysis is based on a theoretically informed, 
empirically based comparison drawing on meso - and micro-level dynamics. 
 
 
Considering in turn the three hypotheses elucidated above, the ensuing article is best 
read as a case study of institutional and partisan resilience in Spain, a counterweight to 
the prevailing interpretation of the instability of the State of the autonomies. The 
survival of the diputaciones is illuminated by the path dependency and functional 
arguments, but it is most convincingly explained in terms of cartel (party) politics, 
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whereby the two leading parties have each had organizational incentives to ensure their 
survival. The central conclusion reached in this article – that parties perform an 
integrative role between structure and agency - is supported in other multi-level systems 
with dispersed authority such as Belgium and, at times, Italy.  The impact of the 
economic crisis since 2008 has stretched these ‘party bargains’ to breaking point.  
 
 
The Longue Durée Argument 
 
200 Years of Provincial Power 
 
Spanish provinces officially appeared for the first time in the liberal Constitution of 
Cadiz in 1812. Nevertheless, the provincial districts and their respective councils were 
only established in 1833. This territorial division followed the model of the French 
Revolution’s départements. Each province was initially ruled by a representative of 
central state called ‘civil governor’ (gobernador civil). Rather as in the French case, the 
Spanish territorial model admitted local claims through the integration of local notables 
in provincial councils (López Rodó, 1959, 153-164). In short, deconcentrating and 
decentralizing logics overlapped for two centuries until the contemporary period when 
the gobierno civil and the diputaciones were institutionalized as two separate 
organizations. 
As in other neighboring countries like France or Italy, Spanish diputaciones have 
endured over time despite the recurrent debates about their elimination to the benefit of 
a more regionalized system. From the perspective of one interviewee, the diputaciones 
have survived because they best represent local democracy, an ‘essential element of 
politics after 40 years of Francoism when municipal and provincial leaders were directly 
selected by the central state’ (Interview with a former adviser from the Barcelona’s 
Diputación, 2014). After the first democratic elections of 15 June 1977, the Spanish 
Parliament (Cortes Generales) was conferred responsibility for writing the new 
constitution. Despite the support of the Catalan and Basque nationalists as well as the 
Communists in favor of a federal polity, the centrist Union for the Democratic Centre of 
Adolfo Suárez – partly backed by the Socialist Party of Felipe González – imposed the 
diputaciones in the new administrative system (Bonime-Blanc, 1987).  
The constitutional compromise brought together the Napoleonic centralizing 
tradition with some features of German federalism (Page and Goldsmith 1987). On the 
one hand, the 1978 Constitution guaranteed the sovereignty of Spain as a unitary state 
divided into provinces ruled by a provincial council. In parallel, the Constitution 
preserved the position of civil governors (officially the Sub-delegates of Government – 
Sub-delegados del Gobierno – since 1997) as representatives of the central state’s 
services. On the other hand, the Constitution created 17 autonomous communities, led 
by their respective regional parliaments and governments. The senate was also re-
established but this upper chamber never constituted a forum of representation of 
decentralized regional governments. In sum, the Transition arrangements created an 
ambiguous regime that allowed the survival of diputaciones as intermediate institutions 
between municipalities and autonomous governments. The first local elections held on 3 
April 1979 were welcomed by the majority of political forces and considered as a 
decisive step towards the consolidation of the Spanish democracy. Despite a limited 
institutional performance, local administration was crucial for structuring social services 
in post-Francoist Spain (Zafra, 2012, 66-83).  
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 Almost forty years later, the tension between the autonomous communities and the 
provinces is an embedded feature of Spain’s territorial system. A number of key staging 
posts have illustrated the power of non-decision-making. In 1981, a commission led by 
Professor García de Enterría (1981) was asked (by the center-right Union for the 
Democratic Centre and the Socialist Party) to write a report about the future of the 
territorial system. The report advocated a rationalization of regional government 
competencies in order to avoid overlapping with provincial administrations. Section 16 
proposed dividing political powers clearly between central state delegations, the 
emerging autonomous communities’ deconcentrated administrations and the 
diputaciones. Complex from the beginning, the bureaucratic growth of the ‘State of 
autonomies’ produced an ever more complex map of local governance after the 
rejection of these measures by the Constitutional Court in 1983 and the subsequent 
constitutional protection of diputaciones (García López, 1984, 107-142). This historical 
decision produced a flexible territorial system oscillating between centralization and 
decentralization that has been successively described as a ‘non-institutional federalism’ 
(Colomer, 1998, 40-52) or as an ‘incomplete federalism’ (Grau i Creus, 2000, 58-77). 
 
The Incomplete Reforms of Provincial Government 
 
A total of 38 provinces are ruled by a diputación, viz. an institution governed by a 
president and his/her vice-presidents, his/her cabinet (junta) and the council (pleno).  
Nevertheless, there are several exceptions to this rule. Firstly, not all of the Spanish 
autonomous communities are divided into provinces; in some regions, the autonomous 
community simply absorbed the provincial government. This is the case in Madrid, 
Asturias, Cantabria, Murcia, La Rioja and Navarre where there is a regional government 
but no provincial government. Secondly, the Balearic and Canary Islands are ruled by 
insular councils (consejos y cabildos insulares) and not by diputaciones. Lastly, in the 
Basque Country, the three provinces (Alava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa) are led by 
diputaciones forales. In contrast with other Spanish provincial governments, the Basque 
diputaciones forales have important service delivery functions such as tax collection 
(figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 (about here) 
 
 
Several proposals have been formulated for reshaping this complex territorial 
scheme. However, not one has modified the modus operandi of diputaciones until now. 
As a consequence, the Spanish diputaciones are one of the few institutions of the state 
that have remained practically unchanged since 1978. The diputaciones are 
administered according to article 141 of the 1978 Constitution, along with the 7/1985 
Law on Local Government and the Royal Decree of 1986 (Garrido López, 2000, 115-
138). The 7/1985 Law was slightly modified in 1999, introducing the concept of 
subsidiarity under the pressure of European integration. In 2003, a new category of 
cities was approved (the so-called ‘big cities’), along with some modifications of 
mechanisms of inter-municipal cooperation. Three years later, the Socialist Executive 
led by Prime Minister Zapatero attempted to modify the equilibrium between 
municipalities and diputaciones by converting the latter into councils of local mayors. 
Nevertheless, that reform was abandoned mainly because of the internal opposition of 
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some local sections of the Socialist Party and it had no impact on the governance of 
provinces (Zafra, 2011, 91-99). 
 More recently, the Spanish government of the conservative People’s Party (Partido 
Popular, PP) passed the 27/2013 Law for the Rationalization and Sustainability of 
Local Government, designed to strengthen the control of the provinces (diputaciones) 
over cities and towns of fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, as well as promoting the merger 
of small municipalities. This new proposal potentially affects 95% of all Spanish 
municipalities. Its main objective consists in transferring progressively the competences 
of municipal administrations to the provincial level without the need to merger small 
hamlets in an authoritarian fashion. This reorganization was approved by the absolute 
majority of the PP in Parliament, supported by the Basque Nationalist Party and Union 
of the Navarrese People. Nevertheless, it provoked the disagreement of the remaining 
political parties, for whom the PP’s law did not address the real problems generated by 
the diputaciones, that is their mode of election and their policy-making system (Campus 
Acuña and Lago Peñas, 2013, 9-11). The PP’s proposal has not come into force yet, 
partly because of the opposition of some autonomous governments, and partly because 
of the internal hostility of conservative local mayors (Fernández, 2014).  
 
Diputaciones as Multi-task Organizations 
 
In fieldwork, many interviewees pointed to the problem of complexity and the 
overlapping of competencies between diputaciones and the other decentralized 
institutions. The different reforms enacted over 35 years basically consisted in adding 
successive layers to the previous strata rather than modifying the system in a radical 
way according to a criterion of rationality. In such a territorial scheme, the role of 
diputaciones depends partially on the balance of power among local and regional 
institutions. Broadly speaking, the scientific literature has demonstrated that the 
presence of sub-municipal organizations (the so-called EATIM: entidades de ámbito 
territorial inferior al municipio like pedanías or anteiglesias) and small municipalities 
tended to boost the role of diputaciones by converting their members into gatekeepers 
between local actors and public resources (Lapuente Giné, 2013, 12-16). The 
relationship of diputaciones with the remaining tiers of government follows a different 
pattern. Big city councils, inter-municipal grouping (e.g. comarcas, mancomunidades, 
consorcios and metropolitan areas) and the decentralized bureaus of regional 
governments (the so-called delegaciones del gobierno autonómico) can usually ignore 
the diputaciones. But, in times of financial scarcity, this situation produces competition 
and tensions between the various authorities as a result of overlapping competences in 
policy areas like water supply, transportation and sanitation (Toscano Gil, 2010) (figure 
2).  
 
 
Figure 2 (about here) 
 
 
As in other European countries like the United Kingdom, this institutional version 
of the debate about the future of diputaciones opposes the supporters of policy-oriented 
organizations to those who defend the diputaciones as a traditional tier of local 
representation. As shown by Hooghe and Marks (2003, 233-243), multi-level polities 
can work in very different ways: ‘One type conceives of dispersion of authority to 
general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of 
10 
 
governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions’. 
Following that analytical grid, a civil servant working for the Diputación of Seville 
asserted:  ‘All the competencies presently exerted by the Diputación could be managed 
by a reduced set of quangos. This could save lots of money and human capital. Single-
task institutions are already used in Spain in the field of water supply through 
mancomunidades: we could extend this kind of public management to other fields 
currently ruled by diputaciones’.  
This statement was repeated frequently during the interviews of officials with a 
technical profile (e.g. accountants, project managers or auditors). In the words of one 
civil servant from Valencia’s Diputación: ‘Diputaciones should be ‘project 
administrations’ [policy-oriented administrative units], since these ‘executive agencies 
can perform very well’. For this interviewee, indirectly elected councilors could be 
replaced by technical managers, if necessary controlled by an elected board based on the 
model of the council-city manager (Saffel and Basehart, 2009). But such technocratic 
perspectives have run against three main obstacles; the association of broad-based 
provincial authorities with general purpose, democratic local government organizations; 
the political and policy functions performed by the diputaciones and, above all, the 
pivotal role performed by the main parties in provincial governments, the object of the 
next section.  
 
 
The Party Service Bargain Argument 
 
The Predominance of Party Patronage 
 
In the introductory section we formulated the question: is the absence of territorial 
change best understood in terms of resource-based, instrumental arguments about 
partisan politics and the role of parties as rent-seekers, determined to preserve their 
resources within the provincial governments? In interviews, there was a critical 
consensus in relation to the shortcomings of the 38 ‘common regime’ provincial 
governments (that is those not ruled by exceptional dispensations like in the Basque 
Country or the islands) specifically in relation to the democratic procedures of selection 
of provincial elected officials that favor the established parties and their organizations. 
Unlike the municipalities and regional parliaments, the provincial deputies of the 
diputaciones are not directly elected by citizens. According to the terms of the Organic 
Law 5/1985 (modified in 1987), these deputies are indirectly elected by the town 
councilors returned during the municipal polls and previously selected by the regional 
branches of political parties. These provincial representatives (25, 27, 31 or 51 
according to the population of the province) are designated through a mechanism of 
party-list proportional representation based on the D’Hondt method.  
The electoral system used strengthens the control of the two leading parties, 
especially in terms of candidate selection. As an academic specialist of Spanish local 
government stressed in an interview realized in 2013: ‘the main problem lies in the 
control exercised by the political parties over the diputaciones’. Provincial deputies are 
elected in the framework of partidos judiciales – a sub-division of provinces used for 
organizing the judicial administration – that divide provinces into smaller electoral 
constituencies. The partidos are only used to determine the number of representatives in 
each diputación. These seats are not attributed to individual candidates on a territorial 
basis, but to their political formations (viz. the parties who participated in the municipal 
elections). Consequently, the sharing of provincial council seats is a matter of internal 
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party bargaining (Garrido López, 2000, 191-199). As confirmed by a former deputy 
from Seville’s Diputación, provincial elected officials have very little room for 
maneuver since the selection of candidates is organized by the regional party leaders, 
along with local notables. Furthermore, the provincial deputies’ activities are controlled 
through strong parliamentary discipline.  
One of the major criticisms of diputaciones relates to the misuse of budgets in 
pursuit of party patronage. As previous studies have demonstrated, the spending policy 
of diputaciones in the small municipalities has been largely shaped by factors such as 
the electoral cycle, the proportion of undecided voters and, above all, political affinity 
(Solé Ollé, 2006, 32-53; Lago Peñas, 2008, 219-242). In other words: ‘the probability 
for the mayor of a municipality of less than 20,000 inhabitants of getting funds from the 
diputación is higher if he/she belongs to the political party ruling the province’ 
(interview with a member of the city council of a small town near Seville, 2013). The 
logic of patronage between the provincial ‘patron’ and its municipal ‘clients’ is 
encouraged by the budget structure of small towns. Spanish city councils only manage 
13.6% of total public resources (while regional governments control 35.7% of incomes) 
but they assume a broad range of competencies (Ruíz Almendral, 2013, 189-204). Their 
budgets rely on different taxes (basically relating to the economic activity of local 
companies and on the real-estate transactions) but at least 40% of their resources 
directly depend on financial transfers from the autonomous and the provincial 
governments. While big cities can balance their budgets thanks to their own incomes, 
small towns desperately need extra funds for assuming their basic competencies 
(Federación Española de Municipios y Provincias, 2006; Tribunal de Cuentas, 2013).  
The emergence of the diputaciones as an item on the political agenda might be 
interpreted in two ways: first, as a by-product of party political competition and the 
instrumental calculations of the leading parties, and second as a consequence of 
enhanced European Union-level steering over Spanish public finances. The party 
political dimension became apparent on 7 November 2011 during the televised electoral 
debate for the Spanish general elections. On the one hand, the center-left candidate 
Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba (Socialist Party) accused diputaciones of being 
‘preconstitutional’ tiers that ‘duplicated’ the public services now provided by the 
autonomous communities. On the other hand, the center-right aspirant Mariano Rajoy 
(People’s Party) – as a former President of the Diputación of Pontevedra (Galicia) – 
preferred to stress the importance of diputaciones in rural hamlets and minimized the 
financial cost of those organizations (Casqueiro, 2011). As demonstrated by Bernardí i 
Gil and Galán Galán (2010), these ideological positions were deeply shaped by electoral 
interests. Previously, the PSOE had not complained so much about diputaciones and its 
criticisms started with the loss of 14 provincial governments (from 21 to seven) between 
2007 and 2011.1 By contrast, from 2011 to 2015 the PP governed 27 common regime 
diputaciones (plus four controlled by the Catalan nationalists of Convergence and 
Union) and its status quo proposal was then consistent with its majoritarian position. 
Pursuing its partisan interest, the new regulation imposed by the PP through the Law for 
the Rationalization and Sustainability of Local Administration increases the powers of 
diputaciones vis-à-vis small towns.  
 
Big Political Parties as Veto-players 
 
The complex process of constitutional change – whereby territorial reform would 
require a two-thirds majority in the national parliament for modifying the status quo – 
confirms that the main parties in parliament control any modification of the statute of 
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diputaciones. In 2012, the PP and the PSOE respectively controlled 170 and 96 seats in 
the Congress of Deputies, that is, 75% of the lower chamber. This constitutes an 
important institutional deadlock likely to prevent any serious reform. The core of the 
problem lies in the strategic value of diputaciones for the big parties. A simple overview 
of the amount of money and political positions –  not to speak of the related public jobs 
– managed by the diputaciones gives an idea of the importance of those institutions for 
the political party organisations able to control them (table 1). 
 
 
Table 1 (about here) 
 
 
Such rent-seeking behaviour extends to place-specific parties such as Convergència i 
Unió in Catalonia. As the biggest province of Spain, the Diputación of Barcelona is 
frequently presented as the paradigmatic example of an institution serving the needs of 
political parties. As a specialist of local politics interviewed in Barcelona affirmed:  
 
‘The Diputación’s resources feed the internal apparatus of the ruling party […]. It’s not only about 
the 129,000 euros of salary of the president, or the budget of 661 million euros, or the 467 
consultants of deputies… the main interest is the control of about 5,000 public positions of civil 
servants through the different agencies and public companies depending on the diputación. The 
nickname of the Diputación of Barcelona symbolises that wicked game. In the political milieu it is 
known as the ‘feeder’ [el comedero in Spanish or la menjadora in Catalan]… and this is for a good 
reason’.  
 
As shown by Hopkin (2003): ‘In many respects, parties in post-war Italy (and to an 
extent France), and post-transition Greece, Spain and Portugal, were cartel parties long 
before the term was invented’. In the 1970s, the PSOE and the PP quickly evolved from 
being clandestine organizations to powerful public-funded political parties (Katz and 
Mair, 1995, 5-28) aiming to catch the resources within their reach. But the controversies 
around reforming provincial power are not confined to the large political parties.  
A third set of opinions belonging to minority parties was identified during our 
research. While statewide majority parties – and to a lesser-extent the Catalan 
nationalists of Convergence and Union – discuss the benefits of the status quo or minor 
modifications of diputaciones, minority parties are undoubtedly in favor of the 
suppression of that tier of government. Thus, Izquierda Unida (United Left) – a 
coalition created in 1986 and made of former-communists, feminists, pacifists and 
ecologists – and UPyD (Unión, Progreso y Democracia, Union, Progress and 
Democracy) – a centrist party led by former Basque Socialist Rosa Díez – include the 
elimination of diputaciones and the transfer of provincial competences to municipalities 
and autonomous communities in their electoral manifestos and in various initiatives 
proposed to the Congress of Deputies. The declarations of their members put to the fore 
an interesting vision of provincial politics perceived as a ‘tricky game’ between insiders 
and outsiders in which ‘the big parties deliberately exclude the small ones for their own 
purpose’ (interview with an Izquierda Unida affiliate, Seville, 2013). The electoral 
results seem to confirm this declaration since the main national parties (PP and PSOE) 
hold the presidency of all common regime’s diputaciones (with the exception of the 
three Catalan provinces) while electoral rules create a very high barrier that limits the 
rise of small parties at the provincial level. 
 
Two-level Elections and Democratic Deficit 
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Party control is the core dynamic, but it is not the only criticism made of the 
diputaciones. Once again, the ‘democratic deficit generated by the indirect electoral 
system’ (interview with a former deputy of the Diputación of Valencia, 2013) is a 
second objection. At present – in breach of the European Charter of Local Self-
government (Council of Europe 1985) – Spanish provincial deputies are not elected by 
citizens, but by the members of city councils. Therefore, competitors for a seat in a 
diputación do not participate in any provincial electoral campaign based on a binding 
party manifesto. Without electoral debate, ‘responsiveness’ – understood as the 
capability of politicians to respond to the needs of citizens – and ‘accountability’ – 
defined as the capacity of citizens to monitor and sanction officials – are greatly 
diminished. A serving civil servant of the Diputación of Barcelona (in an interview 
realized in 2014) adds: ‘in a context where citizens ignore who their provincial 
representatives are, the low level of public trust in diputaciones is not surprising’. This 
statement is confirmed by a recent Transparency International survey (2012) that shows 
that citizens consider diputaciones as the least transparent entities among territorial 
representative institutions. In 2012 the transparency index of diputaciones barely 
reached 48.6 points, with a great distance between the first rank of Vizcaya (95 points) 
and the last one occupied by Toledo (23.8 points). In comparison, autonomous 
communities and municipal authorities scored an average of 79.9 points and 70.9 points, 
respectively.  
 
 
The diputaciones’ Policy Performance Argument 
 
A Set of Ill-defined Competencies 
 
Is the organizational persistence of the diputaciones best explained by the services 
delivered by these institutions? Does their longevity say more about the latent functions 
they perform than anything else? Are they capable of exercising flexible specialization 
because of the under-specification of their formal role? The Spanish Constitution only 
explicitly defines the competencies of central and regional administrations. Articles 31 
and 36 of the 1985 Law on Local Government simply affirmed that Spanish provincial 
authorities exert functions of ‘coordination and assistance of municipalities’. This is 
why ‘[…] the roster of competencies of diputaciones is still remarkably fuzzy’ in the 
expression of an expert in constitutional law interviewed in 2013. Unlike the 
municipalities, the Spanish diputaciones can adjust their list of activities to their 
incomes (transferred by the central state on the basis of the Value Added Tax and the 
Personal Income Tax). Indeed, in 2012, the common regime diputaciones managed 
about 5.936 million euros.  
On the one hand, with such financial flexibility, it is not surprising that the debt of 
diputaciones remained so low in recent times (only 0.6% of the whole public debt in 
Spain in 2012) in comparison with municipalities (3.1% of the whole public debt) 
(Banco de España, 2014). On the other hand, one interviewee lamented the presence in 
the diputaciones of ‘extractive elites following a rent-seeking policy based on public 
jobs, public grants or access to superior tiers of government’ and pointed to the ‘ghost’ 
airports of Castellón (150 million euros), Ciudad Real (500 million euros) and Huesca 
(40 million euros) that demonstrated the wasteful spending policy led by provincial 
authorities’ (interview with a civil servant from the Seville’s Diputación, 2013). Despite 
these striking cases of budgetary largesse, there is no scientific evidence that the 
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majority of Spanish diputaciones overspend their resources. Indeed, while French 
départements and German kreise’s spending represent 23% of total local spending, that 
amount only reaches 12% in the case of Spanish diputaciones (Bosch and Espasa, 2008; 
Standard and Poors, 2011).  
 
The Rural-urban Divide 
 
As shown in other similar countries (Bertrana, Espinosa and Magre 2011, 224-242), the 
debate about diputaciones is intimately linked to their social environment. For reasons 
of territorial dispersion and demographic density, the daily work of diputaciones is not 
the same in the countryside as in the big cities. In Spain, the municipal level includes 
8,117 units (and 3,725 local EATIM). 5,700 municipalities have fewer than 2,000 
inhabitants, 4,867 of them have less than 1,000 inhabitants and four out of five 
Spaniards live in one of the 500 biggest municipalities (e.g. Madrid, Barcelona, 
Valencia, Seville or Bilbao) (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2013). As a result, most 
Spanish municipalities are far too small to provide the basic public services imposed by 
the law (like waste treatment, water supply or road maintenance for instance) and this 
situation is especially critical in rural areas. Given these circumstances, the support of a 
superior tier of governance is generally necessary. Different inter-municipal 
mechanisms can be applied since the article 26 of the Basic Law on Local Regime 
imposes specific competencies on municipalities but allows these to be provided in 
collaboration with other subsidiary tiers of government.  
Hence, the arrangements between municipalities and diputaciones are highly 
variable. As shown by the survey led by PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2013) diputaciones 
usually play an important role in the management of basic infrastructures in rural areas. 
They are also relevant actors as back-officers helping the representatives of small 
hamlets in raising taxes or managing the cadastral plan. The interview with a city 
councilor from a small hamlet of the Seville province in 2014 confirms that idea: ‘Some 
hamlets sold their land during the real estate bubble in order to fund basic services for 
their inhabitants, but the end of the building cycle made them poorer than before. The 
dependence vis-à-vis the diputación and the regional governments has increased: they 
have money, we don’t! (laughs)’.  
According to the group of interviewees made up of rural mayors and councilors, 
diputaciones are well adapted to rural territories, in part because they were created when 
the peasantry was the dominant social model in Spain. The main territorial tension lies 
in the fact that since the 1960s, Spain has had one of the highest rates of urbanization in 
Western Europe (about 77.4% of Spaniards are currently living in urban areas) with a 
consistent network of cities of around 1 million inhabitants (United Nations 2014). This 
data casts doubt on the role played by the diputaciones in an urban society, and it is not 
a coincidence if the critical movement against diputaciones started among the mayors of 
big cities:  
 
‘[…] when the effects of the global 2008 crisis dried up Spanish public finances; it was then 
accentuated by the loss of many provincial governments by the PSOE in 2011. Socialist mayors of 
median and big cities […] launched the crusade against diputaciones. According to them, it was 
unfair to oblige city councils to cut their budgets in order to comply with the deficit objectives, 
while provincial leaders didn’t suffer any kind of fiscal corresponsibility’ (interview with a civil 
servant, Diputación of Valencia, 2013).  
 
Initially limited to big city mayors, the reaction against the diputaciones soon 
spread to conservative local politicians, who shared this vision of diputaciones as unfair 
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(Prieto 2012). There is clear evidence that the political backing of rural mayors for the 
diputaciones has diminished since the adoption of the 2013 law on local governance 
pushed by the PP. This law sets out the principle that municipalities with fewer than 
20,000 inhabitants that are unable to provide their obligatory services without deficit, 
will have to transfer these competencies to the provincial level. Obviously, this reform 
affects primarily rural hamlets (Suárez Pandiello, 2013, 17-20).  
 
The Local-rural Veto 
 
In the same way, the new law attempts to incentivize the merger of municipalities 
through: ‘a higher funding per capita, a temporary waiver of the obligation to deliver 
new services […] and a preferred status for being considered in local co-operation plans 
or grants’ (OECD, 2014). Beyond the issue of the Spanish government’s capacity for 
merging small towns, this reform raises the question of the rise of diputaciones to the 
detriment of rural city councils. The attempted rationalization of Spanish local 
government has been justified in terms of complying with the European Union 
recommendations for containing the public deficit. One People’s Party’s deputy 
interviewed in 2014 protested that ‘the (merger) law only reflects the need to contain the 
deficit according to the instructions of the European Union’. In other words, despite the 
evident coincidence with the party’s interests, the increase of provincial powers is 
presented as a question of financial rationality and conformity with European legislation 
and the requirements of the Fiscal Compact Treaty. The arguments forwarded by the PP 
in 2014 were fundamentally similar to those forwarded in 2011 by the Socialist premier 
Zapatero to justify the constitutional reform. In both cases, the European constraint was 
employed as a useful driver of domestic change, a facilitator of a (very real) financial 
retrenchment. Given the fundamental similarity in relation to the macro-arguments 
employed by the two leading parties, the principal variable explaining differentiation 
was the instrumental one of partisan interest. 
Anyway, the traditionally close interpenetration of the PP and certain elements of 
conservative rural Spain has been disrupted by the indirect impact of the economic 
crisis. New tensions have arisen between small hamlets and their traditional party 
political guardians, as the PP-led central government has sought to exercise much 
tighter budgetary and political control over local government. The reform favoring the 
diputaciones over smaller rural hamlets has led the latter to accuse the former of being 
an ‘institutional predator’ (interview with a former civil servant from the Diputación of 
Valencia, 2014). Economic crisis has weakened the politico-institutional nexus formed 
around defending the interests of rural and small town Spain. The 2013 mobilization of 
Galician rural mayors against the reform provided evidence of cross-party mobilization 
against the PP-led government reform (Hermida, 2013).  
And yet, party remains central in terms of mediating intergovernmental 
relationships and regulating conflicts. The capacity of Spanish local authorities to 
mobilize is limited by party control over the main representative organizations of local 
authorities. All Spanish municipalities (urban and rural) are represented by the same 
institution: the FEMP at the national level and its regional counterparts like the FAMP 
(Federación Andaluza de Municipios y Provincias, Andalusian Federation of 
Municipalities and Provinces). In contrast with neighboring countries like France and 
Italy, where specific interest groups defend the rights of small hamlets (like the 
Association des maires ruraux or the Associazione Nazionale dei Picoli Comuni 
d’Italia), Spanish rural municipalities have never achieved such a level of 
institutionalization. As stressed by Jordi Capo Giol (1991, 143-164) Spanish local 
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government – including the FEMP – is highly dependent on national and regional 
parties, and the FEMP is currently led by the principal promoter of the rationalization 
law: the PP. In the words of one specialist: ‘The FEMP is extremely politicized and this 
weakens the horizontal representation of local mayors’. 
In sum: there has been some weakening of the traditional role of the diputaciones as 
benefactors of small rural hamlets in a patron-client relationship. In contrast, there has 
been a strengthening of their functioning as meso-level intermediate local authorities. 
Objections over party control and democratic deficit are counteracted by arguments 
about the appropriate level for the delivery of public services, the requirements of 
European integration and the modernization of the Spanish version of the millefeuille 
territorial that has echoes with developments in several other European countries. In a 
rather paradoxical manner, the weak levels of public debt, and the flexible specialization 
that the absence of statutory service delivery responsibilities allows, ensure the survival 
and institutional adaptation of the diputaciones.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the multiple reforms proposed since 1985, the Spanish diputaciones have 
remained largely unmodified. How to explain this apparent enigma? The institutional, 
partisan and functional arguments all support the maintenance of the status quo. The 
survival of the diputaciones is illuminated by the path dependency and functional 
arguments, but it is most convincingly explained in terms of cartel (party) politics, 
whereby the two leading parties have each have organizational incentives to ensure their 
survival. The impact of the economic crisis since 2008 has stretched these ‘party service 
bargains’ to breaking point.  
Returning to the hypotheses presented in the introductory section, is there a 
hierarchy of explanations? Are diputaciones tied into a pattern of path dependency 
inherited from the Transition? Did the diputaciones survive because they articulate the 
needs of rural Spain? Or is the survival of these institutions best explained by narrow 
party political reasons? The three perspectives each connect with rather different 
dimensions of institutional persistence. First, for all of their democratic deficiencies, the 
diputaciones represent a form of general-purpose local government that was validated at 
a key moment in the development of post-Transition Spanish politics. As in several 
other European countries, multi-level governance does not imply a choice between 
Marks and Hooghe’s type 1 and type 2 authorities, but provides evidence of the co-
existence of both. Second, the diputaciones survived because they fulfil several political 
and policy functions (technical assistance to small hamlets, political articulation of the 
interests of rural and small town communities) more effectively than any other level. 
Such roles of mediation, championing and expertise are comparable with those 
performed by intermediate governments in other European countries (France, Italy and 
Germany). Third, the diputaciones provide valuable organizational and financial 
resources for the main political parties, whose attitude to the survival of these 
institutions correlates somewhat with the number of provincial executives they control.  
This multi-dimensional perspective cautions against simple causalities.  
Considering in turn our three hypotheses, the ensuing article is best read as a case 
study of institutional and partisan resilience in Spain, a counterweight to the prevailing 
interpretation of the instability of the State of the autonomies.  From the perspective of 
intergovernmental relations, this study highlighted that the reform of diputaciones is a 
question of local governance as a whole. It also demonstrated the endurance of local 
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power in Spain despite the rise of a regionalized polity. Though the contemporary 
sharing of political and financial power has converted Spanish politics mainly into a 
two-level game between central state and autonomous governments, local elected 
officials of small hamlets still have influence within intergovernmental networks. As 
investigated in this article, Spain is a quasi-federal country wherein around 5,000 small 
municipalities continue to represent the interests of local elites. Spanish local 
governments are not clearly visible in the daily policy-making process, but they have 
maintained an important veto-power when their interests are directly threatened 
(Agranoff, 2010). The 2014 revolt of local mayors against the proposed reform of the 
diputaciones has been taken into account by intra-party networks. 
 
The evidence offered in this article - of institutional resistance in spite of powerful 
exogenous reform pressures, of party resilience, of functional adaptation to institutional 
uncertainty -  has a more generic interest that supports the conclusions of major studies 
of territorial institutions in cognate countries such as France (Le Lidec, 2012); Germany 
(Benz, 2007), Italy (Bolgherini, 2014) and, in some respects, England (John, 2001). The 
Spanish case underlines a more general finding from other European countries: that 
informal institutions and practices can provide cohesion in an uncertain, relatively 
uncodified institutional configuration. The basic argument that institutions survive 
beyond their initial functions  fits with several possible theoretical positions that are 
evoked in the article: institutional rational choice, for example (Miller, 2000; Lecours, 
2005) as well as historical institutionalism (Pierson, 2000). The main analytical 
contribution of the article, however, is to embed institutional analysis in an original 
understanding of actor strategies, understood by interrogating comparable panels in a 
weighted sample across Spain. The article thus has a more generic interest in terms of 
methodological innovation (moving beyond macro-level analysis without falling into 
the trap of pure methodological individualism), theoretical development (especially 
with its contribution to understandings of structure and agency) and the comparative 
insights (into formal and informal institutionalism, processes of party linkage and 
satisficing policy outcomes) drawn from a most similar comparison with a particular 
national context.   
The article has not described a state of happy incremental layering, however. As 
stressed by different scholars (Bernecker and Maihold, 2007), Spanish democracy has 
progressively shifted from a democracy of consensus to a regime of polarization. In 
other words, the series of political pacts that characterized the Transition opened a new 
era of tension between the political forces with very little room for compromise. In 
these conditions, polarization limits the capacity of provincial actors to find a 
compromise. In view of those sources of blockage, a complete and consensual reform of 
diputaciones seems difficult in the short-term.  
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